The Australian Patient Safety Foundation was formed in 1987; it was decided to set up and co-ordinate the Australian Incident Monitoring Study as a function of this Foundation; 90 hospitals and practices joined the study. Participating anaesthetists were invited to report, on an anonymous and voluntary basis, any unintended incident which reduced, or could have reduced, the safety margin for a patient. Any incident could be reported, not only those which were deemed "preventable" or were thought to involve human error. The Mark 1 AIMS form was developed which incorporated features and concepts from several other studies. All the incidents in this symposium were reported using this form, which contains general instructions to the reporter, key words and space for a narrative of the incident, structured sections for what happened (with subsections for circuitry incidents, circuitry involved, equipment involved, pharmacological incidents and airway incidents), why it happened (with subsections for factors contributing to the incident, factors minimising the incident and suggested corrective strategies), the type of anaesthesia and procedure, monitors in use, when and where the incident happened, the experience of the personnel involved, patient age and a classification of patient outcome. Enrolment, reporting and data-handling procedures are described. Data on patient outcome are presented; this is correlated with the stages at which the incident occurred and with the ASA status of the patients. The locations at which the incidents occurred and the types of procedures, the sets of incidents analysed in detail and a breakdown of the incidents due to drugs are also presented. The pattern and relative frequencies of the various categories of incidents are similar to those in "closed-claims" studies, suggesting that AIMS should provide information of relevance to those wishing to develop strategies to reduce the incidence and/or impact of incidents and accidents.
military pilots and aircraft during trammg. It was modified and introduced into anaesthesia by Cooper in 1978; J this was a retrospective study using taperecorded reports from anaesthetists who had been asked to describe' 'preventable incidents that he or she had observed or participated in that involved either a human error or equipment malfunction". For the purposes of the Cooper study an anaesthesia critical incident was defined as "an occurrence that could have led (if not discovered or corrected in time) or did lead to an undesirable outcome, ranging from increased length of hospital stay to death or permanent disability". To be included it also had to have the following characteristics: "1) it involved an error by a member of the anaesthesia team or a failure of the anaesthetist's equipment to function properly; 2) it occurred at a time when the patient was under the care of an anaesthetist; 3) it was described in clear detail by a person who either observed or was involved in the incident; 4) it was clearly preventable".
The "critical-incident" technique was first used to study anaesthesia-related problems in Australia (in Townsville) in the early 1980s. 4 ,5 Subsequently, incident reporting systems were introduced at the Prince of Wales Hospital in Sydney 6 and at the Royal Women's Hospital in Melbourne. 7 It was decided to form the Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF) in 1987,8 and to set up and coordinate the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) as a function of this Foundation. 9 The coordinating group for AIMS consisted of the co-authors of this paper.
METHODS
The Incidents. It was decided to invite all participating anaesthetists to report, on an anonymous and voluntary basis, any unintended incident which reduced, or could have reduced, the safety margin for a patient. In line with the method of Morgan,7 it was decided to include all incidents, not only those which were deemed "preventable" or were thought to involve human error. Thus, an anaphylactic reaction in a patient with no previous history of drug allergy is reportable to AIMS, whereas it would not have been in some of the previous studies. 3, 4 The Mark I AIMS/orm. A reporting form (the Mark I AIMS form) was developed which incorporated features and concepts from several other studies 37 ; all the incidents in this symposium were reported using this form. The front page consists of general instructions to the reporter. The second page contains space for a narrative of the incident, with a section for key words. These may be compiled by the reporter, by the "person on the spot" (see below) or by the APSF data compiler while checking forms prior to entering data into the database; a set of "standard" key-words was progressively assembled.
The third page addresses the issue of "what happened" and "why it happened" (see Figure 1) . The "what happened" section has subsections for circuitry incidents, circuitry involved, equipment involved, pharmacological incidents and airway incidents. The "why it happened" section has subsections for factors contributing to the incident, factors minimizing the incident and suggested corrective strategies.
The fourth page addresses the type of anaesthesia and procedure, monitors in use, when and where the incident happened, the experience of the personnel involved, the age and classification of the patient and patient outcome (see Figure 2 ).
Hospital, Group or Individual participation: A "starter kit" was prepared which included copies of this data entry form, suggestions on how to fill in these forms, and a set of guidelines for the individual in each organisation who was to be the local AIMS coordinator (the "person on the spot" or "POS"). This "kit" was mailed to anyone who expressed interest in participating in the study.
The POS: Each hospital or group requires one volunteer who is designated the "POS" and who is responsible for ensuring that the report forms are available in convenient locations, for encouraging people to fill out the forms, for providing a local forum for discussion of the incidents and for forwarding the completed forms to the APSF for inclusion in the main database, Form Completion: It is recommended that the AIMS form be readily available wherever anaesthetics are administered (ideally, on every anaesthetic machine and in other key places). The form is to be filled out by one of the persons actually involved in the incident. Reports made "second hand" from persons who witnessed part of, or heard about, but were not directly involved in, an incident are discouraged. The form is then deposited in a locked, secure mail box or, if the reporter prefers, handed directly to the POS. It is the responsibility of the POS to arrange for such mailboxes at convenient locations.
Central Data Base: The completed forms are periodically sent by the POS to the APSF. No record is kept of their origin by the APSF. The forms are then photo-reduced to one double-sided A4 page after making sure that any identifying data (such as the occasional mention of the name of a hospital or a patient in the narrative) have been "whited out" and the original destroyed. The front page is not included in this final copy as the "Mark I" form may contain the name of the POS. The narrative is then read and standardized key words are substituted for those used by the reporter. If necessary, additional key words are added by the compiler. More than one incident is reported on approximately 5070 of report forms. In this case further copies of the report form are made, one for each individual incident, the part of the narrative not applicable to that incident is deleted and key words are changed accordingly. The rest of the form is then checked for completeness and for consistency between the narrative and the rest of the form. A unique sequential number is generated for each report form. Single incidents reported on a form have the suffix "a" after the number. In the case of multiple incidents reported on one form, subsequent incidents have suffixes "b", "c", and so on, after the number.
In the section concerning factors which minimised the incident, the incident is deemed to have been monitor detected only if the anaesthetist was totally unaware that a problem was occurring until a monitor alarmed or a change in a waveform or other parameter was noted. If, for example, the anaesthetist was maintaining a difficult airway, and during adaptive manoeuvres the pulse oximeter alarmed because of a falling saturation, this was not deemed to have constituted "monitor detection". If the reporter had written "pulse oximeter" in the "Factors Minimizing Incident" section, the form would be altered by the APSF compiler before entry in the database. Any alterations, however, would be so made that the original text and the alterations remain apparent to any future assessor.
During the time the Mark I form was used, there was no mechanism for obtaining further information if the incident form was incomplete; a means for anonymously doing this is now being developed. III In some cases it was possible to deduce from the narrative some of the data that had not been written on the form. When this could not be done, appropriate codes were generated to indicate missing data in the data retrieval and analysis process.
After checking and standardizing the key words, the data from the form are added to the central computerised database. FoxPro 1\1 (Fox Software, Inc. Perrysburg, Ohio, USA), a proprietary database program, is used for data entry, storage and retrieval. A data entry software program, written in the FoxPro command language and with extensive error checking routines, is used to enter the data and further FoxPro command programs are used to perform the data analysis. The current software in use is "pull-down menu driven"; it is too large to be included here as it comprises over 1,500 lines of code. The structure of the database allows for reports to be searched on key words or combinations of factors using the inbuilt Foxpro command-line functions.
At intervals summaries of the central database are disseminated to those hospitals or groups participating in the study, to the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists, the Australian Society of Anaesthetists, and to other groups such as The Therapeutic Devices Branch of the Federal Government of Australia. Aspects have also been presented at scientific meetings and national workshops.
RESULTS
The first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS were analysed for this symposium; these were reported on 1901 Mark I AIMS forms; 2 incidents were reported on 73 forms, 3 on 10 and 4 on 2. Ninety hospitals or group practices from all States of Australia and from New Zealand are registered as AIMS participants. It is suspected that a number of these are inactive, but it is known that major teaching hospitals in each state of Australia and New Zealand regularly contribute forms.
Just over 75fJ!o of the report forms were completely filled out; the commonest missing data item was whether the procedure was elective or an emergency, followed by the question (now deleted) about the experience of the person responsible for the anaesthetic. In a large number of cases the missing information could be deduced from the narrative or key words. The number of key words varied from 0 to 7, with an average of 2.5. The length of the narratives varied from 1-2 words (e.g. "another disconnect") to two pages; the average length was 96 words.
Patient outcome is presented in Table 1 ; this is correlated with the stages at which the incidents occurred in Table 2 , and with the ASA status of the patients in Table 3 . The locations at which the incidents occurred are presented in Table 4 , and the types of procedure in Table 5 . In Table 6 the sets of incidents analysed in detail elsewhere in this symposium are presented, with the number of incidents in each set. In Table 7 a breakdown of the incidents due to drugs is presented as an example of one of the many sets of incidents that have not yet been analysed in detail.
DISCUSSION
The advantages of a structured incident reporting system have been discussed elsewhere in this issue and include the ability to elicit contextual details about contributing factors, human error, factors minimizing adverse outcome and suggested corrective strategies; the greater likelihood of frank reporting of details because of guaranteed anonymity; far more information because "near-misses" as well as adverse outcomes are reported; minimising "outcome bias" because, in the majority of incidents reported, there is no adverse outcome; the relatively low cost of setting up and running an incident reporting system in relation to the amount of information obtained; data are obtained from many sources, reducing the effect of "site-specific" bias and ensuring the medico-legal safety of the reporter. It is felt that this latter advantage might have been the reason why no active recruiting has been necessary for participants in AIMS.
The AIMS data represent the spectrum of incidents which individual anaesthetists felt motivated to report. It is highly likely that unusual, interesting or particularly dangerous incidents (e.g., air embolism, anaphylaxis) are more likely to have been reported than mundane events (e.g., a circuit disconnection that was immediately detected because the low pressure alarm sounded). This tendency was commented on by Flanagan in his original paper, 2 who also conducted a study to show that the longer the time lapse between the incident and reporting the more likely that there would be selective loss of more mundane incidents. 
DJ)' .
Lonl; Term. 1\"11 .. Hence, it is important that forms be immediately available so that more of these "ordinary", but often just as potentially fatal, incidents are reported. It is likely that only a tiny fraction of all incidents is reported. However, as each report constitutes a "biopsy" of the system, a comprehensive representation of current clinical practice may be built up by collation of incidents from many sites over a period of time. At a regional level, many hospitals now base their "morbidity and mortality" meetings on a review of the AIMS reports submitted in that hospital over a period of time. Advantages are the wealth of detail provided, the medico-legal safety, and the change in emphasis from "witch-hunt" to a dispassionate discussion about what is wrong with the system and how it might be improved. 10 Many problems are appropriately solved at this level (e.g., "collapsing" operating tables, lack of spare laryngoscopes at particular sites). 18 Experience has suggested that anonymity and medicolegal safety are key factors in the success of AIMS; the latter may now be assured nationally in Australia by the declaration of AIMS as a specific quality assurance activity under the Health Insurance (Quality Assurance Confidentiality) Amendment Act 1992. Application for such a declaration has been made. Some of the basic data from the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS have been presented (see Tables 1-5) . The database was set up so that sets of data can be cross-correlated (see Tables 2 and 3 for correlation of stages of anaesthesia and ASA status with outcome). Even at this crude level, some trends are apparent and some conclusions may be drawn. For example, it is evident from Table 2 that as much "harm" overall is likely to arise after anaesthesia as during the maintenance phase, in spite of the smaller number of incidents in this latter period; this, backed up by evidence for a similar relative frequency and pattern of postoperative incidents from the "closed-claims" study (see below), would support an argument for reasonable resource allocation to postoperative care.
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, No. 5, October, 1993 While the patient is "on the table" only about onequarter of incidents result in "harm"; this increases to over one-half in the post-operative phase. Also, it is worth noting that, although the prevalence of incidents resulting in "harm" in ASA Grade Ill-V patients is 35-80070, these groups yield less than half the overall number of "harmful" outcomes.
The sets of incidents which have been subjected to detailed analysis elsewhere in this symposium are presented in Table 6 . These analyses entailed searching the database using selected key words and then reading, and often re-reading, the narrative sections of the report forms; these narrative sections have proved essential for the detailed studies of particular areas. Many studies can still be carried out on the first 2000 incidents. An example of a set that has not been examined in detail is presented in Table 7 . At the time of writing, over 3000 incident reports have been received by AIMS; they are steadily being processed. There are some similarities between the AIMS data presented in this symposium and those from Cooper's original study. Cooper found that 83070 of preventable incidents involved human error; the AIMS study found that 79070 of all incidents reported involved human error. 11 The timing of the incidents was similar, with the majority occurring during the maintenance phase (59 vs 48070 in AIMS), followed by induction (26 vs 25 1r /o in AIMS), emergence and recovery (12 vs 16070 in AIMS) and pre-induction (4 vs 10070 in AIMS).
The most common categories of incidents listed by Cooper are not all directly comparable with the AIMS categories because of different classification techniques, but, where direct comparisons are possible, the relative percentages are similar. The most common category in both studies was "breathing circuit disconnection" (8070 in each study). "Syringe swap" accounted for 5070 of all incidents in Cooper's study, and for 7070 in AIMS. Misconnections accounted for between 2 and 3070 of incidents in both Cooper's study and in AIMS.
In Cooper's second paper'-the factors associated with the incidents were determined. These are equivalent to the predisposing factors in the AIMS study. The top five in Cooper's study appear in the top seven of the AIMS study. Likewise, three of the top four "corrective strategies" in the Cooper paper appear in the top five in the AIMS study. The findings of the early Australian studies also have much in common with those of AIMS.'-There are also similarities between comparable aspects of the AIMS data and those reported from the USA "closed-claims" studies. For example, the pattern, nature and proportion of the total number of reports is similar for both the U.s.A. and the AIMS studies for respiratory complications, recovery room problems and problems arlsmg during paediatric anaesthesia, 11.16.2) .~1X suggesting that the AIMS pattern of incidents, although associated with no adverse outcome in the majority of cases, provides a reasonable /1nuesll!cs'ia and In/('n.sil't! Cart', Vol. 21, 1'\/0. 5, Octo her, /993 indication of what is likely to cause morbidity and death.
At a national level, the AIMS data are providing a wealth of qualitative information about actual problems that are currently occurring during the conduct of anaesthesia in Australia and New Zealand. A "snapshot" is obtained of current clinical practice that is proving valuable in terms of.obtaining an outline of how problems are presenting as well as how they are being handled. For example, there is much information to be passed on about how the 19 cases of air embolism, 57 cases of anaphylaxis and 87 cardiac arrests presented, and about how they were handled.2529,14 Patterns of presentation will be made available to those setting up simulation studies and tests, and deficiencies in clinical practice will be outlined to those responsible for higher professional training and for organizing continuing education meetings.
The pattern of usage of monitors, as well as their strengths and weaknesses, may be defined from their use in actual practice. Suggestions regarding monitor use, calibration and design have been passed on to manufacturers, distributors and users. By collating data, "clusters" of problems have been identified which would not have been apparent from smaller samples. For example, the introduction of ventilators with a "stand-by" mode led to a spate of incidents in which patients were not reconnected. Analysis of AIMS data allowed users, manufacturers and distributors to be advised of this.
The advantages of the relatively low cost and comprehensive nature of the AIMS data and the disadvantages of being unable to determine the absolute incidence of problems are addressed elsewhere in this symposium. 39 Comparisons of the AIMS data with other studies of mortality, morbidity and critical incidents suggest that AIMS is providing a comprehensive body of detailed qualitative information which can be used to develop strategies to prevent and manage existing problems at both regional and national levels as well as to plan further initiatives.
